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Abstract
The Note argues that the Ayuda decision is inconsistent with the congressional intent behind
IRCA and prior case law. The Note further argues that the purposes underlying IRCA will best be
served by prompt judicial resolution of policy disputes about legalization.
COMMENT
AYUDA, INC. v. THORNBURGH: DID CONGRESS GIVE
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH FREE REIN TO
DEFINE THE SCOPE OF
LEGALIZATION?*
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 ("IRCA") after years of debate about illegal immi-
gration.' IRCA sought to redress the phenomenon of illegal
immigration into the United States 2 by legalizing certain un-
documented aliens and imposing sanctions against employers
* This Comment received the 1990 Orlando Conseils Award at Fordham
University School of Law.
1. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (codified in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C. (1988)); see 35 IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, INS REPORTER: WORKING FOR A BETrER AMERICA 4 (Jan. 1988) [hereinafter
INS REPORTER].
2. Statement by President Ronald Reagan upon Signing S. 1200, 22 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1534 (Nov. 10, 1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5856-1. President Reagan took the opportunity to discuss the background and
the goals of the Immigration Reform and Control Act upon the law's enactment:
In 1981 this Administration asked the Congress to pass a comprehen-
sive legislative package, including employer sanctions, other measures to in-
crease enforcement of the immigration laws, and legalization. The act pro-
vides these three essential components. The employer sanctions program is
the keystone and major element. It will remove the incentive for illegal im-
migration by eliminating the job opportunities which draw illegal aliens
here.
We have consistently supported a legalization program which is both
generous to the alien and fair to the countless thousands of people through-
out the world who seek legally to come to America. The legalization provi-
sions in this act will go far to improve the lives of a class of individuals who
now must hide in the shadows, without access to many of the benefits of a
free and open society. Very soon many of these men and women will be
able to step into the sunlight and, ultimately, if they choose, they may be-
come Americans.
Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 45 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649. The HouseJudiciary Committee noted that
the law was intended to "control illegal immigration to the United States, make lim-
ited changes in the system for legal immigration, and provide a controlled legaliza-
tion program for certain undocumented aliens who have entered this country prior to
1982." Id.; see 132 CONG. REC. S16,893 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Simpson). Senator Simpson emphasized the need for border control as an impetus
for the enactment of IRCA, referring to it as a "national issue that will never go away
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who hire undocumented workers.3 IRCA provides for judicial
review of legalization determinations under section 106 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (the "INA"). 4 Section 106
permits judicial review of individual deportation orders by U.S.
courts of appeals only after aliens have exhausted all of their
administrative remedies.5 In Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh,6 the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that
.. . called sovereignty. . . . [T]he first duty of a sovereign nation is to control its
borders." Id.
IRCA does not address the issue of refugee arrivals into the United States. See
H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 49, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5653. For further information on administrative and
legislative responses to refugees, see generally U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, REFUGEES
AT OUR BORDERS: THE U.S. RESPONSE TO ASYLUM SEEKERS (1989); Law on Aliens Fails
to Halt Salvadorans, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1987, at A3, col. 3; and No Refuge From Hai-
tians'Horror, Miami Herald, Dec. 13, 1987, at IA, col. 3.
3. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 45, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL ALIENS:
INFORMATION ON SELECTED COUNTRIES' EMPLOYMENT PROHIBITION LAWS, Pub. No.
GGD-86-17BR (Oct. 1986) (concluding that employer sanctions can deter illegal im-
migration, although they have not proven effective in some countries); 132 CONG.
REC. S16,884 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Moynihan). Senator Moy-
nihan noted that the law's benefits to undocumented aliens already resident in the
United States included "the dignity and honor of supporting themselves and their
families free from the fear of deportation." Id.; D. MEISSNER, D.G. PAPADEMETRIOU,
& D. NORTH, LEGALIZATION OF UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS: LESSONS FROM OTHER COUN-
TRIES 20 (1986) (estimating that probable size of U.S. population to be legalized was
between 1.5 and 2.7 million); Immigration and Naturalization Service, Provisional Le-
galization Statistics (Jan. 9, 1990) (as of January 9, 1990, INS had received 1,768,316
legalization applications and 1,301,970 applications for the Special Agricultural
Worker ("SAW") program). For a description of the SAW program, see infra note 13
and accompanying text.
4. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(l)-
(4) (1988). The relevant parts of section 245A's judicial review provisions are (f)(1)
and (f)(4)(A). Section (f(1) states that "[t]here shall be no administrative or judicial
review of a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status under
this section except in accordance with this subsection." Id. § 245A, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(f)(1). Section (f)(4)(A) states, in reference to limiting judicial review to de-
portation, that "[t]here shall be judicial review of... a denial only in the judicial
review of an order of deportation under 1105a of this title." Id. § 245A, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(f)(4)(A).
5. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1988).
Section 106 states in relevant part:
(a) The procedure prescribed by, and all the provisions of chapter 158 of
Title 28, shall apply to, and shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for,
the judicial review of all final orders of deportation, heretofore or hereafter
made against aliens within the United States ..
(c) An order of deportation or of exclusion shall not be reviewed by any
court if the alien has not exhausted the administrative remedies available to
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federal jurisdiction over legalization regulations, promulgated
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the "INS"),
was also limited to individual deportation challenges under
section 106.7 The Ayuda decision is contrary to a number of
cases that have implicitly or explicitly upheld district court ju-
risdiction over challenges to INS policies and practices.8
This Comment argues that the Ayuda decision is inconsis-
tent with the congressional intent behind IRCA and prior case
law. Part I examines IRCA, federal court jurisdiction over INS
decisions, and judicial interpretations of the issue. Part II ana-
lyzes the Ayuda decision. Part III argues that IRCA permits ju-
dicial review of INS legalization regulations by the district
courts. This Comment concludes that the purposes underly-
ing IRCA will best be served by prompt judicial resolution of
policy disputes about legalization.
him as of right under the immigration laws and regulations or if he has de-
parted from the United States after the issuance of the order.
Id.
6. 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S.
Dec. 27, 1989) (No. 89-1018).
7. 880 F.2d at 1337-38.
8. See, e.g., National Center for Immigrants Rights v. INS, 743 F.2d 1365, 1369
(9th Cir. 1984) (holding that because plaintiffs did not seek review on merits of any
individual determination by INS, district court jurisdiction to examine merits of
plaintiffs' challenges was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 8 U.S.C. § 1329); Hai-
tian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1033 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (recogniz-
ing that courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction over final orders of deportation,
but establishing an exception "insofar as the [complaint] set[s] forth matters alleged
to be part of a pattern and practice by immigration officials to violate the constitu-
tional rights of a class of aliens"); see Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp.
1488, 1503 (C.D. Cal. 1988). Orantes distinguished between challenges under section
106 and challenges to INS policies:
These claims do not assert irregularities in individual deportation hearings,
but rather a pattern and practice by immigration officers to violate the con-
stitutional and statutory rights of a class of aliens.... To require plaintiffs
to raise claims relating to transfer of class members after arrest, inadequate
access to counsel and lack of notice of asylum in deportation proceedings
would effectively ensure that some class members would never be able to
raise the claims or secure redress.
Id.; see Ali v. INS, 661 F. Supp. 1234 (D. Mass. 1986); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957
(1 th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
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I. INS DECISIONS: FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION AND
JUDICIAL REVIEWABILITY
A. IRCA and Its Legislative History
As part of a comprehensive overhaul of U.S. immigration
laws,9 Congress sought to stop illegal immigration by legaliz-
ing certain undocumented aliens and enacting employer sanc-
tions.' o The legalization program, under section 245A of the
INA, offered resident status to eligible aliens who had entered
the United States before January 1, 1982 and had continually
resided in this country since that time." Employer sanctions
impose civil and criminal penalties on employers who know-
ingly hire illegal aliens.12 Additionally, Congress offered legal
status under the Special Agricultural Worker ("SAW") pro-
gram to certain aliens who had worked in perishable crops. 13
The SAW program was intended to address the labor needs of
agricultural growers, who have traditionally relied On undocu-
mented aliens for a labor supply.' 4
An important goal of IRCA was to concentrate the limited
resources of the INS on border enforcement and on employ-
9. Gordon, New Immigration Legislation: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986, the Marriage Fraud Act, and the State Department Efficiency Bill, 1 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
641 (1986).
10. See supra notes 1-2 (discussing congressional and administrative intent be-
hind IRCA).
11. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a
(1988).
12. Id. § 274A, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a.
13. Id. § 210, 8 U.S.C. § 1160. The program provided for adjustment of status
of certain aliens who had performed 90 man-days of seasonal agricultural services in
the twelve-month period ending on May 1, 1986. Id. § 210, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1160(a)(1)(B)(ii). The application window was the eighteen-month period from
June 1, 1987 to November 30, 1988. Id. § 210, 8 U.S.C. § 1160(a)(1)(A). Although
the eligibility criteria for this program differed from the legalization criteria in many
respects, the standard for judicial review was identical. Id. § 210, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1160(e)(l)-(3); see Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson, 872 F.2d 1555 (1 Ith Cir.
1989) (upholding a challenge to INS implementation of SAW program), petition for
cert. filed sub nom. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 58 U.S.L.W. 3566 (U.S.
Feb. 20, 1990) (No. 89-1332).
14. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1000, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 95-97, reprinted in
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5840, 5850-53. Although agricultural grow-
ers' use of undocumented workers was undisputed, it was unclear whether they
would suffer as a result of IRCA's enactment. See Immigration Reform Hasn't Dried Up
Pool of Farm Labor, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 27, 1989, at 3, pt.l, col. 3; Amnesty Pro-
gram Has Hurt Growers, The San Diego Union, Aug. 6, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
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ers' compliance with sanctions.1 5 Its success depended on a
generous, one-time-only legalization program that would allow
long-term, undocumented residents of the United States to
emerge from situations of fear and exploitation and enable
them to become full participants in society.' 6
Among those eligible for legalization were aliens who had
entered the country legally as non-immigrants, but whose sta-
tus subsequently became unlawful through the passage of time
or some violation such as unauthorized employment.' 7 These
aliens could be legalized if their unlawful status became
"known to the government" before January 1, 1982,18 and if
they resided continuously and unlawfully in the country since
that time. 9 To be eligible for legalization, all aliens had to
apply to the INS or a community organization known as a
"qualified designated entity" ("QDE")20 between May 5, 1987
and May 4, 1988.
15. INS REPORTER, supra note 1, at 18.
16. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. S16,880 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Simpson). Senator Simpson emphasized the need for legalization as a "necessity if
we are going to preserve our scarce INS resources, to deter future illegal immigra-
tion, and to remove a fearful, easily exploited subclass from our society. These
things will only happen along with employer sanctions and more immigration en-
forcement." Id.; see 132 CONG. REC. S 16,914 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Biden). In his statement during floor debate about the immigration bill, Senator
Biden expressed his hope that legalization would resolve the problems of undocu-
mented people: "Hopefully, this will move a growing underclass living in the
shadows into the daylight of citizenship and opportunity. These individuals must
become full partners in government and full participants in our society .... Id.
17. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 245A, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(a)(2)(B) (1988).
18. Id.
19. Id. § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(A).
20. Id. § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(l)-(4). Congress was aware that many aliens
would be afraid to apply for legalization and, therefore, established "qualified desig-
nated entities," community organizations trusted by the undocumented population
that would encourage aliens to apply and assist them in the process. The QfDEs'
statutory mandate was to serve as an intermediary between the INS and the appli-
cants. Id.
21. Id. § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(l)(A); H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong. 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 72 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 5649,
5676. The House Judiciary Committee report explained that legalization was to be a
generous, but also unique and time-limited opportunity: "The Committee intends
that the legalization program should be implemented in a liberal and generous fash-
ion .... Such implementation is necessary to ensure true resolution of the problem
and to ensure that the program will be a one-time only program." Id.; see 132 CONG.
REC. S16,888-89 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statements of Sen. Simpson). Senator
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In enacting legalization, Congress recognized that the
presence of an underground population in U.S. communities
was detrimental to the well-being of society as a whole.22 Un-
willing to risk exposure, undocumented individuals were afraid
to seek needed services such as emergency medical care, treat-
ment for contagious diseases, or protection from crime. 23
Simpson explained that Congress hoped and expected that undocumented aliens
would come forth and apply for legalization:
This is the first call, and the last call, a one-shot deal. Come on out .... We
are actually here to say if you come forward, you will be legalized if you can
show that you have been in the United States since before January 1, 1982.
... This is a generous nation responding; instead of going hunting for
you and going through the anguish of that in the cities and communities of
America, this is it. It is one time. You either show up on this one or you will
be rejected by the employers ....
Id.; see IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., PROCEDURES MANUAL FOR THE LE-
GALIZATION AND SPECIAL AGRICULTURAL WORKER PROGRAMS OF THE IMMIGRATION RE-
FORM AND CONTROL ACT OF 1986 II-I1 (1987) (discussing application period).
22. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL ALIENS: INFLUENCE OF ILLE-
GAL WORKERS ON WAGES AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF LEGAL WORKERS, Pub. No.
GAO/PEMD-88-13BR (March 1988); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, UNDOCUMENTED
ALIENS: ESTIMATING THE COST OF THEIR UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE, Pub. No.
GAO/PEMD-87-24BR (Sept. 1987); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL ALIENS:
LIMITED RESEARCH SUGGESTS ILLEGAL ALIENS MAY DISPLACE NATIVE WORKERS, Pub.
No. GAO/PEMD-86-9BR (April 1986); see 132 CONG. REC. S16,895 (daily ed. Oct.
17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Wilson). In advocating legalization, Senator Wilson
expressed his belief that the presence of illegal immigrants has a negative impact on
other U.S. residents:
Do these illegal immigrants pose a threat to employment for U.S. citizens?
Have they increased crime and burdens upon law enforcement? Have they
increasingly burdened local governments that provide health care, various
types of welfare assistance? Have they finally, even in a hospitable nation,
reached such a saturation point that they have deteriorated the attitude of
hospitality and replaced it with resentment and with fear?
The unhappy answer to all these questions is "Yes!"
Id.
23. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5817, 5818. The House Committee on Energy and
Commerce was concerned with the public health implications stemming from the
existence of undocumented communities and wanted to alleviate the fears that pre-
vent undocumented persons from seeking medical care. The Committee noted that
[a]lthough poor undocumented aliens may be particularly vulnerable to
communicable diseases, they may not, as a practical matter, have access to
needed public health or medical services. Living illegally in this country
with the fear of being detained or deported, many undocumented aliens are
unwilling to consult public clinics, and are unable, due to their inability to
pay, to consult private physicians.... The fear of being apprehended, com-
bined with lack of health coverage and the inability to pay, combine effec-
tively to deny poor undocumented aliens access to needed immunization
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They were easy targets for exploitation in the workplace, hous-
ing, and elsewhere.24 Ultimately, the uneasy coexistence of
two classifications of people, one living outside the full protec-
tion of U.S. laws and the other within, was inconsistent with
fundamental U.S. notions of equality. 2
5
To address the presence of an illegal population in the
United States, IRCA adopted the two-pronged approach of
employer sanctions and legalization. 26 Legalization would ad-
just the status of those aliens who had firmly established them-
selves in the United States, while sanctions and border en-
forcement would prevent more recent illegal immigrants from
setting down roots.27 The enactment of employer sanctions
services and primary care. Not only does this circumstance jeopardize the
health status of these individuals and their children, it undermines public
health efforts to contain contagious diseases.
Id.; see 132 CONG. REc. S16,893 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Simp-
son). In describing the exploitation of undocumented aliens by unscrupulous em-
ployers, Senator Simpson pointed out that
[w]e have people who chose to take these people, have them here, use them,
exploit them, and I think we fought a war about that about 120 years ago
when we had people called slaves. It is what you got [sic] in the United
States when you have a whole subculture of human beings who are afraid to
go to the cops, afraid to go to a hospital, afraid to go to their employer who
says "One peep out of you, buster, and you are down the road."
Id.
24. 132 CONG. REC. S16,896 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Wil-
son). Senator Wilson described the abominable living conditions of some undocu-
mented farmworkers, noting that
a subclass of workers [exists in the U.S.] who are by their illegality vulnera-
ble to exploitation. As an example, agricultural workers for whom housing
is provided by growers are often afraid to live in that housing for fear they
will be an easy target for the INS and the Border Patrol. So instead they
literally go to earth, to live like animals in holes in a way that no one in
America or elsewhere should be forced to live.
Id. Apparently, the problem has not disappeared since IRCA's enactment. See GEN-
ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, "SWEATSHOPS" IN NEW YORK CITY: A LOCAL EXAMPLE OF A
NATIONWIDE PROBLEM, Pub. No. GAO/HRD-89-1OBR (June 1989).
25. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (describing exploitation and
living conditions of undocumented persons).
26. 132 CONG. REC. H10,584 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Rodino). House Judiciary Committee Chairman Rodino described legalization and
employer sanctions as IRCA's interlinked components, stating that they "have been
in every Judiciary Committee bill since 1975 and any bill that does not contain both
cannot be called immigration reform." Id. Chairman Rodino also expressed his
strong conviction that neither component could be enacted or prove effective inde-
pendently of the other. Id.
27. Id.; see supra note 16 (discussing connection between legalization and em-
ployer sanctions).
367
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mandated the creation of a legalization program 28 because, for
the first time, the employment of undocumented workers
would become a legally punishable offense.29 Persons unable
to acquire legal status would be exposed to severe economic
hardship as a consequence of their inability to obtain, or loss
of, employment.30
Congress was aware that legalization had to be generous
in order to succeed. 3 ' At the same time, it knew that undocu-
mented aliens feared coming forward and identifying them-
selves to the INS. 32 Consequently, Congress included safe-
guards in the legalization program to encourage maximum
participation by all eligible aliens.3 3 These safeguards in-
28. 132 CONG. REc. H10,591 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Shaw).
Representative Shaw noted that legalization was the only practical option if sanctions
were to be enacted, explaining that
you are not going to send them back. There are millions and millions of
illegal aliens in this country ....
... [W]hat is the alternative? The alternative is to have our INS people
continue to labor, overwhelmed by numbers, being able only to keep up
with the paperwork, and then say to them, "Go out and enforce employer
sanctions."
Id.
29. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 274A, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a
(1988) (mandating civil and criminal penalties for employment of unauthorized work-
ers).
30. 132 CONG. REC. S16,884 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Moyni-
han). In addressing the consequences of enacting employer sanctions without legali-
zation, Senator Moynihan pointed out that "[i]mposing such penalties without pro-
viding some degree of amnesty will leave millions of these individuals with no means
of support. Inevitably, then, the American taxpayer will be forced to foot the bill."
Id.
31. See supra note 21 (describing congressional intent regarding legalization);
H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 49, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5653. In introducing legalization, the House Judiciary
Committee expressed its strong belief that "a one-time legalization program is a nec-
essary part of an effective enforcement program and that a generous program is an
essential part of any immigration reform legislation." Id.
32. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 73, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5677. The House Judiciary Committee described
its study of legalization programs in other countries and noted that in many of these
programs the alien turnout was significantly lower than expected, a phenomenon at
least partly attributable to aliens' fears of coming forth to apply. Id.
33. Id. The House Judiciary Committee adopted certain safeguards to alleviate
the fears of potential applicants, including complete confidentiality of legalization
applications, establishment of a public education program, and designation of com-
munity organizations to assist applicants in filing with the INS. Id.
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cluded a nationwide public education program, 34 absolute con-
fidentiality of legalization applications,35 and creation of QDE
status for certain community organizations that provided coun-
seling assistance to aliens in pursuing legalization.3 6 Further-
more, Congress mandated that applicants who presented a
primafacie legalization claim could not be deported 37 and could
receive temporary work authorization until a final determina-
tion on their application was made by the INS.38
Congress was also emphatic about the one-time-only char-
acter of legalization. 39 All those eligible had to apply within
the twelve-month window of opportunity or forfeit the right to
obtain legal status.40 Therefore, it was important that all statu-
torily eligible individuals come forth before the application
deadline to achieve Congress' goal of eliminating the undocu-
mented underclass. 41
B. Reviewability of INS Decisions: Federal Court Jurisdiction
1. Statutory Authority
Section 279 of the INA gives federal district courts juris-
diction over civil and criminal causes that arise under the
INA.4 2 In addition, federal courts may also review controver-
sies involving the INS under federal question jurisdiction.43
Based on these jurisdictional foundations, many federal dis-
trict courts have entertained challenges to INS policies and
34. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(i)
(1988); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1000, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 93, r.printed in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5649, 5848.
35. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 245A, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(c)(5) (1988).
36. Id. § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(2)(A).
37. Id. § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(e)(2)(A).
38. Id. § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(e)(2)(B).
39. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent in
enacting legalization).
40. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent in
enacting legalization).
41. See supra notes 2, 16, 21, 26, 31-33 and accompanying text (discussing con-
gressional intent in enacting legalization).
42. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 279, 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (1988).
The statute grants broad jurisdiction to the federal district courts: "The district
courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of all causes, civil and criminal,
arising under any of the provisions of this subchapter." Id.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
3691989-19901
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regulations."
Section 106 of the INA governs the judicial review of final
orders of deportation.4 5 Section 106, which supercedes the ju-
risdictional mandate of section 279, limits judicial review of de-
portation orders to the U.S. courts of appeals.46 Such review is
available only after the individual has exhausted all administra-
tive remedies, a process that can take years.47 Thus, district
courts do not have jurisdiction to review individual deporta-
tion orders.
IRCA provides that judicial review of "a determination re-
specting an application" for legalization will only be provided
in the context of an order of deportation under section 106.48
The judicial review provisions of the legalization process, how-
ever, do not expressly address district court jurisdiction over
INS programs and policies.49
2. Judicial Interpretation
Although IRCA does not specifically address federal dis-
trict court jurisdiction over challenges to INS legalization poli-
cies, a number of federal district courts have assumed such ju-
risdiction,50 basing it on the federal question statute-"or on
44. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing pre-IRCA decisions that
address immigration challenges).
45. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 106, 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1988).
For the relevant text of section 106, see supra note 5.
46. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 106, 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1988).
47. Id; see infra note 127 (discussing length of deportation proceedings).
48. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 245A, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(m(1)-(4) (1988). For the relevant text of legalization's judicial review provi-
sions, see supra note 4.
49. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 245A, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(f)(l)-(4) (1988). For the relevant text of legalization's judicial review provi-
sions, see supra note 4. Most U.S. courts, therefore, have assumed that Congress did
not intend to speak to district court jurisdiction over legalization regulations and that
these regulations remain governed by section 279 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1329
(1988). For the relevant text of section 279, see supra note 42.
50. See, e.g., Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
Permanent Injunction and Redefinition of Class at 4, Zambrano v. INS, No. S-88-455
(E.D. Cal. July 31, 1989). The court differentiated between judicial review of a denial
of legalization and the review sought in district court, pointing out that the
"[p]laintiffs' complaint challenged defendants' policies and practices and was not an
attempt to gain judicial review of individual denials of legalization applications." Id.;
see, e.g., Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at
12, Immigration Assistance Project v. INS, 709 F. Supp. 998 (W.D. Wash. 1989). In
granting partial relief to plaintiffs, the court reasoned that "[p]laintiffs allege that the
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section 279 of the INA. 52 These legalization cases are consis-
tent with a series of pre-IRCA immigration decisions. Fed-
INS has denied legalization to its members and clients-a significant deprivation.
Denial ofjudicial review would as a practical matter, completely foreclose any oppor-
tunity to present plaintiffs' claims." Id.; see, e.g., Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nel-
son, 694 F. Supp. 864, 874 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (challenging INS administration of SAW
program), aff'd, 872 F.2d 1555 (11 th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed sub nom. McNary
v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 58 U.S.L.W. 3566 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1990) (No. 89-
1332). In Haitian Refugee Center, the district court explained that "the plaintiffs allege
that the defendants have exceeded their authority by illegal implementation of stated
congressional intent. To deny jurisdiction would be to allow illegal agency action to
go unchallenged." Id.; see, e.g., Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 665-66
(D.D.C. 1988) (challenging INS definition of "known to the government"), vacated sub
nom. Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed,
58 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1989) (No. 89-1018). In discussing its reasons for
granting jurisdiction, the district court in Ayuda said that
[u]nless this court issues a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs will be ir-
reparably injured. The evidence is clear that the INS' . . . regulations have
deterred many aliens who would otherwise qualify for legalization from ap-
plying. If the current regulations remain in force . . . the vast majority of
these potential applicants will fail to file before the May 4 deadline .... If an
otherwise eligible alien does not submit an application prior to May 4, 1988,
he or she may well be forever barred from applying for legalization.
Id.; see, e.g., Doe v. Nelson, 703 F. Supp. 713, 721 (N.D. Ill. 1988). In Doe, the plain-
tiffs challenged an INS regulation requiring aliens who had been issued orders of
deportation to apply within the first 30 days of the legalization application period or
within 30 days of issuance of an Order to Show Cause. Id. Doe distinguished the type
of relief sought in district courts:
[T]he INS cannot seriously argue that a pattern of constitutional violations
becomes intolerable only once a threshold number of people are victim-
ized.... Success on the claims in this court will not automatically predeter-
mine the result of their legalization application .... [I]t will only require that
the application be evaluated according to statutory provisions.
Id.; see, e.g., Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Meese, 664 F. Supp. 1378 (E.D. Cal.
1987) (action to enjoin the exclusion of aliens eligible for SAW program who had not
yet filed applications); Vargas v. Meese, 682 F. Supp. 591, 597 (D.D.C. 1987) (chal-
lenging INS regulation that limited filing for the SAW program within the United
States to applications submitted by individuals who entered the United States before
June 26, 1987). The court in Vargas affirmed the judiciary's role in interpreting con-
gressional intent: "Although courts often defer to the expertise of agencies in inter-
preting statutes that they administer, it is for the courts to determine whether an
agency's interpretation of a statute is inconsistent with the intent of Congress." Id.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (1988). For the relevant text of section 279, see supra note
42.
53. See supra note 8; see also Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson, 872 F.2d
1555, 1561 (11 th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed sub nom. McNary v. Haitian Refugee
Center, Inc., 58 U.S.L.W. 3566 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1990) (No. 89-1332). In Haitian Refugee
Center, the plaintiffs challenged the SAW program, which is subject to the same judi-
cial review provisions as legalization. The court of appeals determined that
the individual plaintiffs here do not seek substantive review of any individual
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eral courts have generally distinguished between challenges to
individual orders of deportation under section 106 and broad
policy challenges that affect the rights of many aliens.54 Recent
district court rulings have affirmed this premise and found that
under IRCA, challenges to individual legalization determina-
tions may only be brought in the courts of appeals in the con-
text of challenges to deportation orders.55 Federal district
courts, however, may review general INS policies, programs,
and regulations.56
Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit in Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson 57 specifically affirmed
district court jurisdiction over a claim involving INS implemen-
tation of the SAW amnesty program.58 The judicial review lan-
guage provided in the SAW program is identical to that pro-
vided in the legalization program under section 245A 5 9-it
also limits the judicial review of "determination[s] respecting
an application" to section 106 of the INA.6 °
Several Supreme Court decisions have also addressed
challenges to immigration regulations, policies, and statutes in
the context of section 106.61 The Court has permitted such
ruling respecting their status. Rather, they challenge the adequacy of the
procedures employed in the processing of their SAW applications. Accord-
ingly, the exhaustion requirement imposed by section 1105a has no bearing
on the district court's jurisdiction in this action.
... Exhaustion is not required.., where the administrative remedy will
not provide relief commensurate with the claim.
Id. (footnote omitted).
54. See supra notes 8, 50 & 53 and accompanying text (discussing federal court
decisions in immigration challenges).
55. See supra notes 8, 50 & 53 and accompanying text (discussing federal court
decisions in immigration challenges).
56. See supra notes 8, 50 & 53 and accompanying text (discussing federal court
decisions in immigration challenges).
57. 872 F.2d 1555 (11 th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed sub nom. McNary v. Hai-
tian Refugee Center, Inc., 58 U.S.L.W. 3566 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1990) (No. 89-1332).
58. Id. at 1563.
59. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 210, 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(1)-
(3) (1988).
60. Id.; see Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1l105a
(1988).
61. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392
U.S. 206 (1968) (finding that courts of appeals do not have exclusive jurisdiction
under section 106 over discretionary suspension of deportation decisions not made
in course of deportation proceeding); Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963) (finding that
courts of appeals have original jurisdiction under section 106 over discretionary deci-
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challenges to be adjudicated by the U.S. courts of appeals in
the context of section 106 review because the challenges were
directly incident to deportation proceedings or were governed
by the regulations applicable to deportation proceedings.6 2 In
each case, the plaintiff was subject to a final order of deporta-
tion.63 While the Supreme Court has not specifically decided
that federal district court jurisdiction exists over challenges to
INS policies that have no direct bearing on a deportation or-
der, it has said that in situations where section 106 does not
apply, an alien's proper remedy lies in an action brought in
district court.64
sions relating to suspension of deportation). Chadha clarifies that court of appeals
jurisdiction under section 106 is limited to matters on which the validity of a final
deportation order depends. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 938-39. In Chadha, the Supreme
Court held that because the plaintiff's challenge to his deportation order stood or fell
on the challenged veto's validity, court of appeals jurisdiction under section 106 was
proper. Id. These decisions suggest that matters on which an individual order of
deportation does not directly depend, such as challenges to general policies and
practices, are not properly reviewable by courts of appeals under section 106. See
Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58
U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1989) (No. 89-1018). The dissent in Ayuda distin-
guished Chadha and Foti:
In both Foti and Chadha, the alien seeking court of appeals review was
subject to an outstanding final order of deportation. . . . The Supreme
Court predictably held that an alien who is subject to a final order of deportation
can challenge all matters on which the validity of that final order is contingent
in his appeal of the order under § 106 .... This is quite different, however,
from holding that under no circumstances can the legality, or presumably
even the constitutionality, of INS regulations and policies be directly chal-
lenged outside the § 106 procedure.
Ayuda, 880 F.2d at 1358 (Wald, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
62. See supra note 61 (discussing Supreme Court decisions that address section
106).
63. See supra note 61 (discussing Supreme Court decisions that address section
106).
64. See supra note 61 (discussing Supreme Court decisions that address section
106). The Court, however, has considered a policy challenge by undocumented Hai-
tians who had been denied parole injean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). Although
the Court in Jean did not consider the issue of district court jurisdiction, it affirmed
the Eleventh Circuit's remand of the case to the district court. Id. at 848. In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court has affirmed district court jurisdiction in immigration mat-
ters. In Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, the Court affirmed district court jurisdiction outside
the scope of section 106 of the INA. 392 U.S. 206 (1968). The Court said that "[iun
situations to which the provisions of § 106(a) are inapplicable, the alien's remedies
would, of course, ordinarily lie first in an action brought in an appropriate district
court." Id. at 210.
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II. AYUDA, INC. v. THORNBURGH
Four immigrant counseling organizations, two of them
QDEs, and five individual plaintiffs65 initiated Ayuda, Inc. v.
Thornburgh6 6 less than two months before the legalization ap-
plication filing deadline of May 4, 1988.67 In Ayuda, the plain-
tiffs challenged the INS interpretation of "known to the gov-
ernment. ' 68 The INS narrowly defined "government" to en-
compass only the "INS," ' 69 thus barring from eligibility aliens
whose unlawful status may have been known to other federal
agencies such as the Social Security Administration or the In-
ternal Revenue Service. 70 The plaintiffs filed the Ayuda action
six months after the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas found that the INS regulation was inconsistent
with IRCA and exceeded the scope of the authority of the
INS. 71 The Texas suit was not a class action, and the INS
chose not to modify its regulation to conform with the court
decision. 2
On March 30, 1988, the district court in Ayuda found that
the INS definition of "known to the government" violated the
clear statutory language of IRCA.73 The government did not
appeal this decision.7 ' The court, however, retained jurisdic-
tion over the matter and subsequently issued several supple-
mental orders.75
On April 21, 1988, twelve additional immigrant counsel-
ing organizations moved to intervene in the case as plaintiffs.
76
65. Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 654-55 (D.D.C. 1988), vacated sub
nom. Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed,
58 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1989) (No. 89-1018).
66. Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650 (D.D.C. 1988), vacated sub nom.
Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58
U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1990) (No. 89-1018).
67. Ayuda, 880 F.2d at 1327.
68. Ayuda, 687 F. Supp. at 651.
69. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(d) (1989).
70. Id; see Ayuda, 687 F. Supp. at 653, 663-64.
71. See Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
72. See Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 653-54 (D.D.C. 1988), vacated sub
nom. Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed,
58 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1989) (No. 89-1018).
73. Ayuda, 687 F. Supp. at 662-64.
74. Ayuda, 880 F.2d at 1328.
75. Ayuda, 687 F. Supp. at 666.
76. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 4-5, Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d
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They sought to extend "known to the government" legaliza-
tion eligibility to aliens who violated section 265 of the INA."
Until it was amended in December 198i, section 265 required
that aliens file quarterly or annual reports with the INS, giving
their address. 78 The proposed intervenors withdrew their mo-
tion after the plaintiffs adopted the section 265 arguments as
their own. 79 Two days before the legalization deadline of May
4, the district court entered a supplemental order, extending
legalization eligibility to aliens who willfully violated section
265 because their non-compliance with the law was, or should
have been, known to the INS.8" The government appealed
that supplemental order and questioned the court's jurisdic-
tion over the section 265 issue.8 In effect, the government
thereby challenged all district court jurisdiction over INS deci-
sions regarding the legalization program. 2
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
vacated the lower court's decision,8 3 finding that the district
court lacked jurisdiction to review INS legalization policies
under IRCA.8 4 The majority agreed with the government that
Congress expressly limited jurisdiction over legalization poli-
cies to the courts of appeals under section 106.85 Thus, only
an applicant who had been denied legalization, placed in de-
portation proceedings, and issued a final order of deportation
could challenge INS legalization regulations. 86 However, such
1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry
of Supplemental Order VIII at 9).
77. Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1989), petition for
cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1989) (No. 89-1018).
78. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 265, 8 U.S.C. § 1305, amended by
Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 11, 95 Stat. 1611, 1617 (1981). Until the law was changed in
1981, aliens were required to submit regular address reports regardless of whether
their address had actually changed. Id.
79. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 5, Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325
(D.C. Cir. 1989)'.
80. Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 668 (D.D.C. 1988), vacated sub nom.
Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58
U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1989) (No. 89-1018).
81. Ayuda, 880 F.2d at 1329.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1326.
84. Id.
85. Id. at,337-38.
86. See infra note 136 (describing what a denied legalization applicant must do to
challenge regulation).
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an applicant must pursue deportation voluntarily because
IRCA's confidentiality provision would protect the applicant
from deportation as A consequence of a legalization denial.8 7
Although the majority recognized the unusually restrictive na-
ture of this standard of review, 88 it nevertheless concluded that
Congress intended to bar district court jurisdiction over chal-
lenges to legalization regulations.8 9
The majority's reasoning referred to the fundamental pur-
poses behind the enactment of section 106-to prevent ex-
ploitation of the judicial process by skillful attorneys attempt-
ing to buy time for their clients and to minimize frustration of
the deportation process by devices such as forum shopping.90
Moreover, the court reasoned that because Congress did not
require the INS to promulgate legalization regulations, 9 Con-
gress must have assumed that statutory interpretations by the
INS would only be reviewed in the context of individual depor-
tation orders.92 The court noted that if Congress had intended
the INS' interpretations of the statute to be reviewed by the
courts,93 Congress would have required the promulgation of
87. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 245A, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(c)(5) (1988). The text states, in relevant part:
Confidentiality of information. - Neither the Attorney General, nor any
other official or employee of the Department ofJustice. . . may ... use the
information furnished pursuant to an application filed under this section for
any purpose other than to make a determination on the application.
Id.
88. Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1329-30 (D.C. Cir. 1989), petition
for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1989) (No. 89-1018).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1331 n.5 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. at 23, 28-29,
reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2967, 2972-73).
91. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 245A, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(g)(1) (1988). The statute only requires that the INS establish a definition of
the term "resided continuously," and "such other regulations as may be necessary.
Id. § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(g)(1)(A)-(B).
92. Ayuda, 880 F.2d at 1332-33.
93. Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 73, reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5649, 5677. In reference to continuous residence,
the Judiciary Committee report said that "some flexibility may be necessary in ac-
cepting documents in proof of continuous residence. . . . [M]any undocumented
aliens have been clandestinely employed and thus may not have the usual trail of
records." Id. The Committee went on to say that
[u]nnecessarily rigid demands for proof of eligibility for iegalization
could seriously impede the success of the legalization effort. Therefore, the
Committee expects the INS to incorporate flexibility into the standards for
AYUDA, INC. v. THORNBURGH
regulations covering the statute's possible applications and
created a mechanism for their judicial review. 94
The majority also relied on Senate deliberations about ju-
dicial review before IRCA's enactment.95 The Senate's origi-
nal proposed language would have permitted no judicial re-
view under the legalization program. 6 The majority con-
cluded that the Senate acquiesced to the final statutory
language only because it did not permit judicial review to
reach beyond the limited scope of section 106.97
The majority buttressed its argument that section 106 pro-
vided the sole means of review of INS policies under IRCA by
referring to several Supreme Court opinions concerning sec-
tion 106.98 These cases involved plaintiffs who were subject to
final orders of deportation and who had sought judicial relief
from deportation.99 These plaintiffs challenged general immi-
gration policies or decisions that were directly relevant to the
outcome of their deportation orders and were permitted by the
Supreme Court to do so in the context of section 106.100 Ac-
cording to the majority in Ayuda, these rulings suggest that sec-
tion 106 provides the only appropriate forum for judicial re-
legalization eligibility... taking into consideration the special circumstances
relating to persons previously living clandestinely in this country.
Id.
94. Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1989),petition for
cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1989) (No. 89-1018).
95. Id. at 1334-35.
96. See S. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(0(1) (1985); Ayuda, 880 F.2d at
1334-35. But see H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 74, reprinted in
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5678. The HouseJudiciary Committee
report discusses only judicial review of individual legalization determinations and
does not contemplate federal court jurisdiction over INS policy decisions: "The bill
provides for limited ... judicial review of denials of applications for legalization....
[T]he applicant can appeal a negative decision within the context ofjudicial review of
a deportation order." Id. The House language was adopted in full by the Senate in
conference. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1000, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 92, reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5840, 5847.
97. Ayuda, 880 F.2d at 1334-35.
98. Id. at 1335-36. For a discussion of some of the cases considered by the
Ayuda majority, see supra note 61.
99. See supra note 61 (discussing Supreme Court decisions that address section
106).
100. See supra note. 61 (discussing Supreme Court decisions that address section
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view of INS policies.' 0 '
The Ayuda court relied on Heckler v. Ringer ' 02 to demon-
strate the need to exhaust all administrative remedies before
seeking review in the federal courts." 3 The plaintiff in Ringer
sought declaratory judgment to ascertain whether a specific
medical treatment would be reimbursable under Medicare.10 4
The U.S. Supreme Court found that the plaintiff could not
challenge the Medicare regulation before obtaining the treat-
ment sought. 0 5 By analogy, the Ayuda court suggested that a
legalization regulation cannot be challenged before a final or-
der of deportation has been issued.'
06
In addition, the Ayuda court discussed several lower court
cases that distinguished between section 106 review of individ-
ual deportation orders and district court review of INS policies
that violate the statutory rights of aliens.'0 7 It dismissed these
cases, however, as inappropriate attacks on the ability of the
101. Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1335-36 (D.C. Cir. 1989), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1989) (No. 89-1018).
102. 466 U.S. 602 (1984).
103. Ayuda, 880 F.2d at 1336.
104. Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. at 609-10, 620.
105. Id. at 627. In Ringer, the Supreme Court also discussed the need to exhaust
administrative remedies:
In the best of all worlds, immediate judicial access for all these parties might
be desirable. But Congress ... struck a different balance, refusing declara-
tory relief and requiring that administrative remedies be exhausted before
judicial review of the Secretary's decisions takes place. Congress must have
felt that cases of individual hardship resulting from delays in the administra-
tive process had to be balanced against the potential for overly casual or
premature judicial intervention in an administrative system that processes
literally millions of claims every year.
Id. (footnote omitted).
106. See Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1989), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1989) (No. 89-1018). The govern-
ment also challenged the district court's order on the ground that the issue presented
was not ripe for judicial review. Id. at 1341. To determine ripeness, the Ayuda court
adopted the balancing test set forth in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
(1967). Ayuda, 880 F.2d at 1341-42. In Abbott, the Court balanced the issue's fitness
for judicial review with the hardship that the parties will suffer if it is withheld: "The
problem is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of
the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration." 387 U.S. at 149. The Ayuda court concluded that the INS policy in
question had not been firmly formulated and, therefore, did not constitute final
agency action. 880 F.2d at 1341-42.
107. Ayuda, 880 F.2d at 1336-38. For a discussion of some of the cases consid-
ered by the Ayuda majority, see supra notes 8 & 50.
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INS to carry out its functions effectively." °8 Without further
elaboration, the Ayuda court also implied that a distinction may
exist between challenges to the INS under IRCA and other
challenges under the INA:" °9 while IRCA challenges do not
fall within district court jurisdiction, other challenges under
the INA may be reviewable by the district courts. °
III. INS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEGALIZATION
PROGRAM IS NOT BEYOND JUDICIAL REVIEW
AYUDA MISREAD CONGRESSIONAL
INTENT AND PRIOR CASE LA W
In repudiating district court jurisdiction over legalization
policy decisions, the Ayuda court is inconsistent with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit."' Specifically,
Ayuda conflicts with the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Haitian
Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson," 12 which upheld district court juris-
diction in a challenge to INS policies under the IRCA
farmworker amnesty program."' The court in Haitian Refugee
Center agreed with previous decisions that distinguished be-
tween section 106 review of individual deportation orders and
broad challenges to regulations implementing a statutory
scheme." 4 In addition to the Eleventh Circuit, several district
courts ' have applied this established distinction to IRCA.' '5
These district court decisions found that IRCA's judicial re-
view language plainly referred to individual denials of legaliza-
108. Ayuda, 880 F.2d at 1336. The court complained that "the application of
HRC v. Smith has proliferated to the point where it now more nearly resembles a
gaping hole in the middle of the INS's defensive line." Id.
109. Id. at 1337.
110. Id. The court addressed the issue of district court jurisdiction. It stated
that "[i]t is arguable, for example, that certain INS actions--other than those under
IRCA-taken before initiation of deportation proceedings are reviewable in the dis-
trict court under APA standards, despite the exclusivity provision of section 106." Id.
111. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit at 9-13, 15-18, 58 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27,
1989) (No. 89-1018), Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
112. 872 F.2d 1555 (11 th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed sub nom. McNary v. Hai-
tian Refugee Center, Inc., 58 U.S.L.W. 3566 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1990) (No. 89-1332).
113. Haitian Refugee Center, 872 F.2d at 1563.
114. Id. at 1560. For a discussion of cases considered by the Haitian Refugee
Center court, see supra note 8.
115. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing federal court decisions
that address IRCA).
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tion.16 Accordingly, they found jurisdiction present under
section 279 of the INA' 7 and the federal question statute."18
Substantial support exists for the necessity of judicial re-
view of legalization regulations." 9 In enacting IRCA, Con-
gress intended to create an effective, generous legalization
program. 20 Evidence of congressional intent included the es-
tablishment of QDEs to provide counseling in a non-threaten-
ing environment, a mandated public education program,122
and a guarantee of absolute confidentiality to all who came
forth to apply in good faith. 123
Moreover, the substantial number of successful challenges
to legalization regulations during the program further evinces
the need for judicial review in the district courts.' 24  These
challenges resulted in the extension of legalization eligibility to
new groups of aliens who had previously been unjustly ex-
cluded from the program. 125 Had district court jurisdiction
been denied in these cases, thousands of aliens may have lost
the opportunity to apply for legalization because they would
have missed the application deadline. 12 6 Obtaining judicial re-
116. See supra notes 8 & 50 and accompanying text (discussing immigration chal-
lenges in federal courts before and after IRCA's enactment).
117. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing federal court decisions
that address IRCA); Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 279, 8 U.S.C. § 1329
(1988). For the relevant text of section 279, see supra note 42.
118. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing federal court decisions
that address IRCA); see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
119. See supra notes 8 & 50 and accompanying text (discussing immigration chal-
lenges in federal courts before and after IRCA's enactment).
120. See supra notes 21 & 31 (expressing congressional intent that legalization be
generous).
121. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 245A, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(c)(2)(A)-(B) (1988).
122. Id. § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(i).
123. Id. § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(5).
124. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing federal court decisions
that address IRCA). Extensive media coverage throughout the legalization program
demonstrated a high level ofjudicial activity as well as public interest. See Court Bars
Deportation of Aliens Until Amnesty Cases Are Settled, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1988, at A26,
col. l;Judge Overturns INS Rules on Denial of Amnesty, Wash. Post, Aug. 11, 1988, at A9,
col. 1; Lawsuit: Amnesty Rule Penalizes Legal Entrants, Miami Herald, Sept. 17, 1987, at
7B, col. 1.
125. See supra note 50 (discussing federal court decisions that address IRCA).
126. Plaintiffs-Appellees' Response to Court's November 3, 1988 Order Re-
questing Further Briefing at 2, Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Thornburgh, Nos. 88-
15046, 88-15127, 88-15128 (9th Cir. Nov. 14, 1988). Plaintiffs summarize the poten-
tial consequences of Ayuda, stating that
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view of a deportation order under section 106 can take
years. 127 Thusjudicial resolution of regulatory disputes under
section 106 would have come after May 4, 1988.128 Signifi-
cantly, courts may lack the ability to reopen an application win-
dow for immigration benefits. 29 As a result, any remedy that
courts provide to improperly excluded applicants after May 4
may be meaningless.
Therefore, the Ayuda decision effectively allowed the INS
to disregard congressional intent in implementing the legaliza-
tion program. In enacting section 106, Congress did not in-
tend to frustrate its own goals or the claims of bonafide legaliza-
[i]f section 1255a(f) could be read to deprive the federal courts of jurisdic-
tion over statutory and constitutional challenges to the INS's implementa-
tion of IRCA, it would mean that the agency could violate with impunity the
legislative scheme and even the fundamental constitutional rights enjoyed
by statutory beneficiaries. The INS could issue regulations that denied le-
galization to all aliens from Europe, or to all aliens whose native tongue was
Tagalog, and there could be no meaningful review of those plainly unlawful
regulations.... Congress could not have intended such an absurd result.
Id.; see Brief For Appellees at 19, LULAC v. INS, No. 88-6447 (9th Cir. Feb. 16,
1989).
127. See, e.g., Matter ofRusin, I. & N. Interim Dec. 3123 (Oct. 31, 1989) (adjudi-
cating case wherein alien was issued Order to Show Cause in 1981 and found deport-
able in 1984); see also Plaintiffs-Appellees' Petition For Rehearing and Suggestion for
Rehearing En Banc at 11-12, Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
128. See infra note 129 (discussing whether courts may extend legalization dead-
line); Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Wald, C.J.,
dissenting), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1989) (No. 89-1018).
129. See INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875 (1988). In Pangilinan, the Supreme
Court ruled that a court could not extend a congressionally established application
deadline by estoppel or through equitable means. Id. at 883. The plaintiffs in
Pangilinan were Filipino nationals who sought citizenship under a 1942 U.S. statute
that authorized certain Filipino veterans of the U.S. Armed Forces to apply for U.S.
citizenship over a five-year period. Id. at 877-78. The application deadline was De-
cember 31, 1946. Id. at 880. Plaintiffs filed suit almost forty years later. Id. at 877.
Whether the fact situation of most legalization challenges in the district courts, in-
cluding Ayuda, is distinguishable from Pangilinan has not been decided. Arguably,
Pangilinan and Ayuda are distinguishable because potential beneficiaries of the Ayuda
ruling did not have a reasonable opportunity to file and may not even have been
aware of their eligibility for legalization, whereas plaintiffs in Pangilinan had ample
opportunity to apply for naturalization. In Re Thornburgh, 869 F.2d 1503, 1514-16
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (denying government's mandamus petition in Ayuda because it could
not establish "inescapability of Pangilinan's vise"). In addition, unlike the statute
challenged in Pangilinan, IRCA itself makes no specific reference to a May 4, 1988
deadline. See 8 I.S.C. § 1255a(a)(1)(A). The scope of Pangilinan, however, remains
uncertain. Therefore, it is conceivable that Pangilinan forecloses any possibility of a
judicial extension of the legalization deadline.
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tion beneficiaries. 13 0
Equally important in assessing the Ayuda opinion is
IRCA's guarantee of absolute confidentiality.' 3 ' To encourage
aliens to apply, IRCA expressly protected applicants from any
threat of deportation, 32 created the QDEs as a buffer between
the undocumented alien and the INS,' 33 and granted appli-
cants permission to work while a determination was made on
their application. 13 4 No enforcement action could be taken on
a denied application unless it was fraudulent, no matter how
easily information contained in the application could prove an
alien's deportability. 35  The Ayuda court undermined these
guarantees. Under the Ayuda court's interpretation, denied le-
galization applicants must voluntarily place themselves in de-
portation proceedings to test the legality of an INS regula-
tion.' 36 Alternatively, they may remain illegally in the United
States, unable to obtain jobs because of employer sanctions,
awaiting eventual apprehension by the INS.' 3 7
Thus, under Ayuda, deportation proceedings would pro-
vide the sole avenue for legalization applicants to seek judicial
130. See Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 215 (1968). In analyzing con-
gressional intent behind section 106, the Supreme Court decided that "Congress
quite deliberately restricted the application of § 106(a) to orders entered during [de-
portation] proceedings ... or [actions] directly challenging deportation orders them-
selves." Id.
131. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 245A, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(c)(5) (1988).
132. Id. § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(e)(2)(A).
133. Id. § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(2)(A)-(B).
134. Id. § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(e)(2)(B).
135. Id. § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(5)(A).
136. Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1989), petition
for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1989) (No. 89-1018). The dissent in
Ayuda described the plight of undocumented aliens wishing to determine whether
they are statutorily eligible for legalization despite regulations that exclude them.
The dissent explained that
[a]n illegal alien told that he is ineligible under INS regulations must decide
which regulations may be unauthorized and step forward to submit his ap-
plication anyway and become a test-case. And not just one such courageous
act would be required; all aliens wishing to avail themselves of the benefits
of a ruling against the regulation must submit applications to the INS . ..
[because] judicial review of the first wave of applications would almost cer-
tainly not take place until long after the twelve-month period had lapsed.
Id. (Wald, CJ., dissenting).
137. See supra notes 21 & 30 (describing IRCA's consequences for aliens who
remain undocumented).
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review of allegedly illegal or unconstitutional regulations., 38
In addition, because legalization applicants are specifically pro-
tected from deportation by the statute's confidentiality guaran-
tee, they must demand deportation. 13 9 In turn, seeking depor-
tation requires them to waive their right to the confidentiality
of their application. 40 The chilling effect on potential appli-
cants in similar straits would be significant: persons whose
greatest fear is deportation would be unlikely to seek it affirma-
tively to determine their rights and may instead choose to
forego legalization and its attendant risks entirely.' 4 '
The Ayuda court also argued that Congress did not intend
INS regulations to be reviewed by the courts because Congress
did not require regulations to be promulgated. 42 In fact, the
legislative history of IRCA indicates that Congress was moti-
vated by a concern for the ability of legalization applicants to
produce adequate documentation and by a desire to achieve
greater flexibility in eligibility requirements. t43 Unnecessarily
rigid INS regulations could only frustrate Congress' intent to
make legalization accessible to a population that had previ-
ously made every effort to remain anonymous.
Moreover, the Ayuda court's reliance on a rejected con-
gressional proposal was inappropriate. 144 The Senate had pro-
posed that judicial review be unavailable under the legalization
program.' 45 The Senate's proposal, however, was rejected in
138. See supra note 136 (describing effort a denied legalization applicant must
make to challenge regulation).
139. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 245A, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(c)(5). For the relevant text of section 245A, see supra note 87.
140. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 245A, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(c)(5).
141. See supra note 136 (describing effort a denied legalization applicant must
make to challenge regulation).
142. Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1332-33 (D.C. Cir. 1989), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1989) (No. 89-1018).
143. See supra note 93 (describing congressional intent regarding promulgation
of legalization regulations).
144. See Ayuda, 880 F.2d at 1352. In characterizing the majority's understanding
of congressional intent, the Ayuda dissent stated that "[tihe problem with [the major-
ity's interpretation of congressional intent with regard to judicial review] is that the
majority can point to absolutely no evidence whatsoever that Congress in fact valued
nonuniformity, uncertainty and slowness in getting major legalization questions set-
tled." Id.
145. S. 1200, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. § 202(0(1) (1985); see Ayuda, 880 F.2d at
1334-35.
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conference. 146 Instead, the House language that ultimately be-
came law limits only the judicial review of individual legaliza-
tion determinations to section 106, but it is otherwise silent in
reference to judicial review. 147
Furthermore, the Ayuda majority's analysis of judicial pre-
cedent is flawed. The majority dismissed a series of cases, be-
ginning with Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, because it reasoned
that these cases inappropriately erode INS's authority.1 48 In
fact, these cases stand on a firm judicial foundation. 49 Before
Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, the Supreme Court established
that claims that are collateral to a substantive claim of entitle-
ment to benefits are properly brought in district courts.'5 0
Collateral claims are not subject to the same administrative ex-
haustion requirements as a substantive claim for benefits.' 5 '
The Supreme Court's holding seems applicable in the immi-
gration area-a challenge to an INS regulation only seeks to
establish the eligibility of a class of aliens for immigration ben-
efits. It does not demand that the benefits be granted, and it is
therefore collateral to a substantive claim such as an individual
deportation challenge.
In the immigration arena, the court in Haitian Refugee
Center v. Smith followed Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 1 2 a Supreme
Court decision that limited the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of appeals under section 106 to challenges directly inci-
dent to a deportation hearing. 5 ' Subsequent Supreme Court
146. See H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 74, reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5649, 5678. For the relevant text of the House
Report's discussion of judicial review, see supra note 96.
147. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 245A, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(f) (1)-(4) (1988). For the relevant text of section 245A's judicial review pro-
visions, see supra note 4.
148. Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing
Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982)), petition for
cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1989) (No. 89-1018).
149. See supra note 61 (discussing Supreme Court cases that address section
106).
150. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 330-32 (1976).
151. Id. at 330.
152. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1032-33 (5th Cir. Unit B
1982) (citing Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968)).
153. Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968); see supra note 61 (discussing
Supreme Court cases that address section 106).
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decisions have affirmed this limitation on section 106.154
These Supreme Court decisions involved individuals in depor-
tation proceedings, and they permitted exclusive court of ap-
peals review under section 106 of challenges that would di-
rectly affect the outcome of a deportation order. 155
The Ayuda court's reasoning failed when it decided that
these cases stood for the proposition that INS policies in gen-
eral could be challenged only pursuant to section 106.156 Spe-
cifically, the Ayuda majority agreed with the Supreme Court
that review of immigration policies directly relevant to a de-
portation hearing or deportation order was proper in the con-
text of section 106."' 7 The majority, however, ignored both
the Supreme Court's careful limitation of the exclusive juris-
diction of courts of appeals under section 106 to challenges
that have a direct effect on the outcome of a deportation order
and the Court's recognition that an alien's remedy lies in dis-
trict court when section 106 is not applicable.15
Similarly, the Ayuda court's comparison of IRCA and a
Medicare statute in Heckler v. Ringer to demonstrate the need
for exhaustion of all administrative requirements is unpersua-
sive. 159 In McKart v. United States,160 the Supreme Court ex-
plained the policies behind the exhaustion requirement. 6 ,
These include avoiding premature interruption of the adminis-
trative process, which allows the agency to develop needed fac-
tual information and to apply its expertise. 62 Concern for ju-
dicial efficiency mandates that an agency should complete its
action or exceed its jurisdiction before courts intervene. 63 Fi-
nally, judicial restraint permits the agency to remedy its own
154. See supra note 61 (discussing Supreme Court cases that address section
106).
155. See supra note 61 (discussing Supreme Court cases that address section
106).
156. See Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1335-38 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1989) (No. 89-1018).
157. See Ayuda, 880 F.2d at 1335-38.
158. Id.; see supra notes 61 & 64 (discussing Supreme Court cases that address
section 106).
159. See Ayuda, 880 F.2d at 1336 (discussing Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602
(1984)).
160. 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
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mistakes and avoids unnecessary public exposure of its weak-
nesses.
6 4
Plaintiffs in Ayuda, however, challenged the legality of INS'
own regulation, not a violation of an established regulation or
policy.' 65 Therefore, administrative review could not provide
a remedy. 66 At each step of the administrative process, the
INS could only review the facts of the individual case before
it. 6 The agency, internally, could not overturn the regulation
by which it had bound itself. 68
In addition, in Matthews v. Eldridge, 169 the Supreme Court
established that the administrative exhaustion requirement is
waivable.170 Such a waiver is particularly applicable when ex-
haustion would be inadequate or futile,' 7 ' as in Ayuda.' 7 2 The
Court has also noted that agency reversal of a policy would be
highly unlikely at the behest of a single plaintiff. 7 '
Moreover, even Heckler v. Ringer, the case cited by the
Ayuda majority, appears to support district court jurisdiction
over challenges to unjust regulations. 174 The Court in Ringer
pointed out that the claims before it were closely intercon-
nected with the plaintiff's claim for benefits. 75 The Court also
noted that the plaintiff was seeking to establish a right to future
164. Id.
165. See Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 651 (D.D.C. 1988), vacatedsub
nom. Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed,
58 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1989) (No. 89-1018).
166. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1035-36 (5th Cir. Unit
B 1982).
167. Id.
168. See U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696 (1974). In reference to the ability of
the executive branch to disregard a valid regulation, the court stated that
[it is theoretically possible for the Attorney General to amend or revoke the
regulation.... But he has not done so. So long as this regulation remains
in force the Executive Branch is bound by it, and indeed the United States as
the sovereign composed of the three branches is bound to respect and en-
force it.
Id.
169. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
170. Id. at 328.
171. Id. at 330-31 (distinguishing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 766-67
(1975)).
172. See Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1361-64 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1989) (No. 89-1018).
173. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 330 (1976).
174. See Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 614, 621 (1984).
175. Id. at 614.
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benefits.' 76 In Ayuda, on the other hand, plaintiffs were at-
tempting to gain the right to apply for legalization, rather than
to receive legalization.' 7 7 This crucial distinction differentiates
the two cases.
Furthermore, the statutory language in the two cases is
not comparable, 78 indicating that congressional intent behind
the two laws is different.' 79 While IRCA's purpose was to en-
courage the maximum number of eligible people to come forth
and legalize during a short time period,180 the Medicare statute
attempted to regulate and manage the flow of claims.' 8 ' The
nature of exhausting remedies is also distinguishable. In
Ayuda, the plaintiff must pursue deportation and face the po-
tential detrimental consequence of being forced to leave the
United States, while in Ringer, the plaintiff must obtain the
medical treatment that he seeks, resulting in his improved
health. 8 2 Thus, Ayuda's reliance on Ringer is inappropriate.
Finally, potential hardship and irreparable harm to the
plaintiffs and other applicants mandates district court jurisdic-
tion. Final regulations were in place.' 8 3 These regulations
precluded certain aliens from eligibility. 8 4 At the same time,
176. Id. at 621. The Court noted that the plaintiff was "clearly seeking to estab-
lish a right to future payments should he ultimately decide to proceed with ... sur-
gery.". Id.
177. See Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989), petition for
cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1989) (No. 89-1018).
178. The statute discussed in Ringer mandated that "[n]o action against the
United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought
under sections 1331 or 1346 of title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this
subchapter." 466 U.S. at 630 n.8 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(h)). The Ayuda dissent
dismisses the two laws as not analogous, explaining that "[u]nlike the Medicare act,
IRCA nowhere attempts to define and prescribe the method of review for 'all claims
arising under' the Act." Ayuda, 880 F.2d at 1359 (Wald, C.J., dissenting).
179. Ayuda, 880 F.2d at 1359 (Wald, C.J., dissenting).
180. See supra notes 2, 21 & 31 (discussing congressional intent in enacting legal-
ization program).
181. See Ayuda, 880 F.2d at 1359 (Wald, C.J., dissenting).
182. See Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Wald, C.J., dissenting), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1989)
(No. 89-1018); Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U S. 602, 614 (1984).
183. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(d) (1989).
184. Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 14, Immigration Assistance Pro-
ject v. INS, Nos. 89-35613 & 89-35706 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 1989). Plaintiffs in Immigra-
tion Assistance Project, who were challenging the same regulation as the Ayuda plaintiffs,
claimed that "[a]pplicants who went directly to the INS, seeking legalization without
the assistance of a QDE or other representation, regularly had their applications re-
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the INS was unwilling to modify the regulations, 85 and the ap-
plication deadline was rapidly approaching. 186 Quite apart
from its probable futility, pursuit and exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies before seeking judicial review under section
106 may have taken years.' 87 Prompt judicial review of INS
policies was necessary to ensure that all eligible aliens had an
opportunity to apply for legalization.
Congress provided for judicial review of a "determination
respecting an application" for legalization 8 8 under section
106.189 The Ayuda court took this to refer to all challenges to
INS legalization decisions, including regulatory language. 90
This assumption is incorrect. Congress was presumably cogni-
zant ofjudicial precedent in the immigration policy arena prior
to enacting IRCA.' 9 ' If it intended to bar federal court juris-
diction over INS legalization policies, it would have done so
more explicitly. 92 Yet, Congress was silent about judicial re-
view of legalization programs and policies."' When it spoke
of legalization determinations, Congress contemplated only in-
dividual decisions.19' Had it intended to overrule prior case
jected out of hand. In other words, no formal filing took place." Id. (emphasis in
original).
185. See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 3, Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d
1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1989)
(No. 89-1018).
186. Id. at 6.
187. See supra note 127 (discussing length of deportation proceedings).
188. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 245A, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(f)(i) (1988) (emphasis added).
189. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1988).
190. See Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1331"-32 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1989) (No. 89-1018).
191. See, e.g., Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U.S. 768, 782 n.15 (1985); Cannon v. Univer-
sity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698-99 (1979); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580
(1978); cf Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 223 (1963) (deciding that courts of appeals have
original jurisdiction over 'discretionary decisions regarding suspension of deporta-
tion). In addressing section 106, the Supreme Court presumed awareness of past
congressional intent. Id. The Court stated that "[i]t must be concluded that Con-
gress knew of this familiar administrative practice and had it in mind when it enacted
§ 106(a)." Id.
192. See Tai Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F.2d 772, 777 (2d Cir. 1966). While discussing
congressional intent in another section 106 case, the court noted that "[i]f Congress
had wanted to go that far, presumably it would have known how to say so." Id.
193. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 245A, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(f)(l)-(4) (1988); supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing congres-
sional intent regarding judicial review).
194. See supra notes 96, 191-92 (discussing congressional intent regarding judi-
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law, Congress would have expressed this intent.' 95
Denial of district court jurisdiction would, in effect, place
the INS above the law in determining legalization eligibility
and defining the scope of the program. Therefore, neither the
interests of Congress nor of the judiciary would be served by
delaying resolution of policy disputes until after legalization
had ended: statutorily eligible applicants could not be helped,
and courts may not be able to provide a remedy.' 96
CONCLUSION
IRCA is the product of extensive congressional debate
and deliberation. It represents a major revision of U.S. immi-
gration laws. Its purpose is to stem illegal immigration into
the United States, and its success depends on effective imple-
mentation. Denial of efficient judicial resolution of regulatory
conflicts would only foster uncertainty and frustrate IRCA's
goals. The stakes are too high, both for the nation's sovereign
interest in controlling its borders and for the individual person
whose commitment to the. United States is unquestioned, but
whose future hangs in the balance.
Zdenka Seiner Griswold *
cial review and presumption of congressional awareness of judicial and administra-
tive precedent).
195. See supra notes 96, 191-92 (discussing congressional intent regarding judi-
cial review and presumption of congressional awareness of judicial and administra-
tive precedent).
196. See supra note 129 (discussing whether courts may extend legalization dead-
line).
• J.D. Candidate, 1991, Fordham University.
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